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APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF 
I. Statement Of The Case 
Appellant Icirlc-Hughes Development, LLC ("I<HD" or "Appellant") brings this 
appeal from the amended memorandum and opinion of the District Court for the County 
of Kootenai. The District Court erroneously applied a legislative standard (even though 
labeled by the court as an administrative standard) in finding that the Kootenai County 
Board of County Commissioner's ("BOCC," "County" or "Respondents") first and 
second decisions to deny KHD's Chateau de Loire Planned Unit Development ("PUD) 
and Preliminary Subdivision Applications were not in excess of their statutory authority, 
made upon unlawful procedure, and arbitrary and capricious as a matter of law. 
Tlie BOCC, instead of fulfilling its administrative and quasi-judicial task to 
adhere strictly to the standards for reviewing a PUD and subdivision application, as set 
forth in the zoning code and subdivision regulations: (1) unlawfully utilized general goals 
of the comprehensive plan to override the definitive standards of the zoning and 
subdivision regulations, ignoring the reports and approval recommendations of the 
Planning Staff and Hearing Examiner; (2) was equitably estopped by failing to abide by 
its Post-Mediation Agreement reached during the appeal on the first hearing to restrict the 
issues to be considered in its secoild hearing on the application; (3) violated substantive 
due process by succumbing to political pressure from certain members of the community 
who advocated opening the second hearing to a general attack on the compatibility of the 
application with the surrounding area; (4) violated procedural due process in the conduct 
of the hearing; and (5) abdicated its administrative responsibilities in favor of arbitrarily, 
capriciously and unreasonably denying KHD's applications thus substantially infringing 
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on KHD's statutory and constitutional rights as a landowner with a specific quasi-judicial 
project application. 
In evaluating specific PUD and preliminary subdivision developmental 
applications from landowners, the BOCC acts in an administrative, quasi-judicial 
capacity-not in a legislative capacity as it does when adopting or amending zoning 
ordinances or a comprehensive plan. The BOCC's only task is to determine whether an 
applicant's proposal complies with the applicable zoning and subdivision regulations. 
The BOCC does not have the discretion to take into account concerns with standards not 
found in the zoning ordinance, including matters expressed by vocal members of the 
community such as whether an area is suitable to any development where the zoning 
ordinance determined that PUD development in the project's zoning district was 
compatible in that area. The harmonization of a PUD development project with the 
comprehensive plan took place at the legislative level when the BOCC adopted Kootenai 
County's zoning ordinances approving PUDs within certain zoning districts as being 
compatible with the goals enunciated by the County's comprehensive plan. 
Here, the BOCC turned this on its head. Once the Neighbors for Responsible 
Growth began putting political pressure on the BOCC, the BOCC abdicated its quasi- 
judicial role and improperly returned to legislative decision making in finding that the 
development was inappropriate for the area.' Despite recommendations for approval 
from the Hearing Examiner and the County's Planning Staff, the BOCC denied KHD's 
first and second applications for development. The BOCC found KHD's applications to 
be incompatible with the surrounding neighborhood, even though this decision had 
I The Board stated that "the single most relevant question is whether this project is appropriate for the 
location," ignoring the fact that the zoning allowed for more than twice as many residences to be built on 
the land. (BOCC August 24,2006 Report, Record on First Appeal, 1971). 
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already been made at the legislative level when the zoning ordinances were enacted. 
Because KHD's applications were in conformity with the zoning ordinances, the BOCC 
could not then re-visit the legislative question of whether the applications were 
compatible with the surrounding area. The BOCC used the County's Comprehensive 
Plan general policies as a weapon to attack KHD's proposal even though Idaho law is 
clear that a local zoning board acting in an administrative capacity on a conditional use 
permit, PUD or subdivision application cannot use the general terms of a comprehensive 
plan in order to deny a developer's proposal that otherwise conforms with the 
requirements of the zoning ordinances in place. 
The decision of the District Court, approving the BOCC's rejections, is out of step 
with Idaho case law and the case law of other jurisdictions around the nation. If the 
BOCC's decision were allowed to stand, the substantive due process rights of all 
landowners in Idaho concerning quasi-judicial administrative approvals would be 
unconstitutionally infringed. Decisions on development applications would no longer be 
governed by the definitive zoning but by subsequently applied vague and amorphous 
standards that a county administrative body would be able to apply to applications on an 
individual basis reflecting the political winds blowing on a given day. 
Further, in this situation the BOCC was equitably estopped from raising new 
concerns regarding ICHD's second application. After the BOCC rejected KHD's first 
PUD application, KHD appealed to the District Court. While that appeal was pending, 
KHD and the BOCC entered into mediation where KHD negotiated in good faith to limit 
the issues in the second hearing in order to avoid further costly litigation. The outcome 
was a Post-Mediation Agreement between KHD and the BOCC that set forth the 
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roadmap for the BOCC to consider upon submission of a second application. KHD 
suspended its appeal and incurred substantial expense to submit a second application in 
accord with that roadmap. In submitting the second application, KHD accomplished 
everything required by the County in the Post-Mediation Agreement, including: 
KHD modified the conceptual PUD plan to incorporate the requirement for an 
overpass of Highway 97 and received approval of all reviewing agencies 
including the Idaho Department of Transportation (ITD); 
I<HD updated the traffic impact studies to show that the effect of the development 
would not exceed the capacity of Highway 97 including peak hours of travel, 
which was approved by ITD and all reviewing agencies; and 
KHD submitted a preliminary subdivision plat which incorporated all of these 
changes. (Clerk's Record on Appeal ("Clerk's ROA"), 387-388.) 
KHD voluntarily agreed to additional considerations after the Post-Mediation Agreement 
was executed, and in reliance on the Post-Mediation Agreement, in order to further 
mitigate the BOCC's concerns: 
JSHD agreed to dedicate land and build a fire station on ihe dedicated land; and 
KHD deleted a gasoline service station and retail to remove any non-residential 
uses alleged to be incompatible with the area. 
Although the Post-Mediation Agreement did not guarantee that KHD's second 
application would be approved, the purpose and intent of the agreement was to work with 
the BOCC to narrow the issues and address any of the BOCC's remaining concerns. The 
obvious intent was to confine the issues on KHD's subsequent application to those 
established in the Post-Mediation Agreement. KHD worked in good faith, incurring 
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substantial expense, to fully implement the terms of the agreement. KHD, in good faith 
reliance, mitigated all issues raised by the BOCC in its denial of KHD's first application 
and the Post-Mediation Agreement. The County Planning Staffs subsequent Report of 
August 23,2007 recommended approval of KHD's second application with standard 
conditions. (County Planning Staff Report, Record on Second Appeal, 2065-2301). 
At this point, local anti-development activists placed major pressure on the 
BOCC. The BOCC breached the terms of the Post-Mediation Agreement, and denied 
KHD's second application. 
The BOCC was equitably estopped from going beyond the agreement terms of the 
Post-Mediation Agreement in reviewing the second application. Nevertheless, in 
disregard of its Planning Staff recommendation that ICHD had complied with all of the 
conditions of the Post-Mediation Agreement, the BOCC impermissibly rejected KHD's 
second application, citing as its findings KHD's failure to conform to five additional new 
goals in the Comprehensive Plan. These new alleged non-compliance "deficiencies" with 
KHD's application were not raised by the BOCC, the Planning Staff or at the hearing 
held by the Hearing Examiner at the time the BOCC denied KHD's first application. Nor 
did the BOCC or Planning Staff raise these new Comprehensive Plan goal "deficiencies" 
when the parties entered into the Post-Mediation Agreement. The failure to raise these 
new issues equitably estopped the BOCC from raising these alleged deficiencies upon 
review of the second application. The District Court erroneously used a fraud standard 
when analyzing estoppel, instead of the completely distinct nationally recognized 
equitable estoppel doctrine in which a local government's affirmative actions cause a 
landowner to incur substantial expense in reliance on the government's actions. 
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In sum, the BOCC rejected KHD's first and second PUD and preliminary 
subdivision applications on the pretext that they were not compliant with the general 
goals of the Comprehensive Plan, despite the fact that the second application met all of 
the requirements set forth in the first decision of the BOCC and the Post-Mediation 
Agreement. This Court is tasked with reviewing the BOCC's decisions de novo without 
giving weight to the decision of the District Court, as if the decisions of the BOCC were 
directly appealed to this Court. KHD respectfully requests that the Court vacate the 
decision of the District Court and remand with instructions that the BOCC approve 
KI-ID'S Second PUD and subdivision application, upon the terms and conditions set forth 
in the Hearing Examiner's Recommendation of Approval to the first application (March 
2,2006 Hearing Examiner Report, Record on First Appeal, 1655) and the Planning 
Staffs Recommendation of Approval of August 23,2007 on the second application 
(County Planning Staff Report, Record on Second Appeal, 2065-2301), and award KHD 
attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code 5 12-1 17. 
11. Issues Presented 
1) Did the District Court err as a matter of law in finding that the BOCC's denials of 
KI-ID's Application for the Planned Unit Development Chateau de Loire on August 24, 
2006 and the Application for the Planned Unit Development and Subdivision Plat on 
December 20,2007 were not an unreasonable, capricious, arbitrary and discriminatory 
denial of substantive due process by reason of: 
a. the findings of the BOCC were legislative in nature instead of quasi- 
judicial, where the BOCC set forth new legislative standards for an administrative 
approval that was outside of the standards set forth in the applicable zoning 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF-Page 6 
34223.1 
district provisions governing Planned Unit Development and subdivision 
approvals; 
b. the findings of the BOCC were based on lack of compatibility with the 
surrounding area despite the applicable zoning ordinance district provisions 
establishing that Planned Unit Development and subdivision was declared 
compatible with the area, resulting in an impermissible legislative rezoning of the 
property; and 
c. the findings of the BOCC were based on lack of conformity with the 
Comprehensive Plan in lieu of implementing the applicable zoning and 
subdivision ordinance provisions establishing the entitlement for the Planned Unit 
Development and subdivision approvals as being compatible with the area, 
resulting in an impermissible rezoning of the property? 
2) Did the District Court err as a matter of law by failing to properly consider that 
the BOCC was equitably estopped, in its review of the second applications for Planned 
Unit Development and subdivision approval, froin raising issues that were not addressed 
upon the denial of KHD's first application or in the written Post-Mediation Agreement 
signed by the BOCC and KHD on January 19,2007? 
3) Did the District Court err in finding that the BOCC did not violate KHD's 
procedural and substantive due process rights by the Board: (a) adopting a 
Commissioner's individual unauthorized on-site " traffic study" of the property without 
giving proper notice to Appellants or to the Board and subsequently advocating 
opposition to and voting against the project, (b) incorporating the Commissioner's study 
to resolve the issue of traffic capacity on Highway 97 to the substantial prejudice of 
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Appellants and inconsistent with the Idaho Transportation Department's finding of 
adequate capacity, and (c) being arbitrarily and capriciously swayed by public sentiment 
and political pressure? 
4) Is KHD entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code 9 12-1 17 because the 
BOCC, in rendering its decisions, acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law? 
111. Factual And Procedural History 
Appellant Kirk-Hughes Development, LLC ("KHD") purchased a total of five 
hundred seventy-eight (578) acres of land located on the eastern shore of Lake Coeur 
d'Alene in 2004 and 2005. KHD's intent was to develop a private resort community 
called Chateau de Loire, which was and is permissible under the zoning of the property. 
The zoning of the land-which remains in place today-authorizes KHD to submit its 
application for a planned unit development ("PUD") without having to request that the 
area be rezoned. (Kootenai County's PUD ordinance provides that "[tlhe primary uses in 
a PUD shall be those allowed or conditionally allowed in the applicable zoning district." 
Kootenai County Code ("K.C.C.") 5 9-15-5.) 
Approximately one hundred eighty-four (184) acres of KHD's land are zoned 
"Restricted Residential" and another three hundred ninety-four (394) acres of the land are 
zoned "Rural." (Record on Second Appeal, 162.) The minimum lot size in the Restricted 
Residential zone is 8,250 square feet (or 5 lots per acre). K.C.C. 9 9-8-3. The minimum 
lot size in the Rural zone is five (5) acres. K.C.C. 9 9-13-3. Kootenai County's zoning 
ordinance regarding planned unit developments provides: 
The overall density, or number of dwelling units in a PUD, shall conform 
to the requirements of the zoning district in which the PUD is located, 
however lot sizes may be varied. If a PUD is located in more than one 
zoning district, the allowable density for the land in each zone shall be 
calculated separately and then added together to yield the allowable 
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density for the development. The distribution of dwellings within the 
PUD shall not be affected by zoning district boundaries. 
1C.C.C. 5 9-15-6. Thus, the total number of lots permitted by Kootenai County's zoning 
ordinance on IWD's land is nine hundred ninety-nine (999). The number of units that 
KHD applied for is four hundred seventy-five (475)-less than half the number that KHD 
is entitled to under the zoning ordinance. 
In May of 2005, I(HD submitted its first application, which was designated as 
PUD 054-05. IWD's plans met all planning and engineer infrastructure requirements for 
fire and roads, for water and sewer and for open space. Public hearings were held before 
the County Hearing Examiner, who recommended approval. (March 2,2006 Hearing 
Examiner Report, Record on First Appeal, 1640-57.) Among other things, the Hearing 
Examiner in his Conclusions of Law found: 
"The proposed conceptual PUD is in compliance with the Kootenai County 
Zoning Ordinance No. 348 Section 15.09C.. ." 
0 "The proposed conceptual Planned Unit Development is compatible with the 
goals and policies of the Comprehensive Plan as previously outlined in Section 5 
of this report." 
"The proposal is consistent with the intent and purpose of the Kootenai County 
Zoning Ordinance. The benefits of the PUD justify the requested deviations from 
normal zoning ordinance requirements." 
"The proposed development is compatible with surrounding uses and natural 
characteristics of the area. Areas not suited for development have been 
incorporated into open space. Site disturbance will be minimized and will be 
required to utilize best management practices to prevent soil erosion. Any site 
constraints, hazards, or negative environmental, social or economic impacts will 
be adequately mitigated." 
"Services and facilities necessary to serve the development are feasible, available 
and any adverse impact will be adequately mitigated." 
"Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth in this 
document, the Kootenai County Hearing Examiner hereby recommends that Case 
No. PUD-54-05, a request by Kirk Hughes and Associates, be APPROVED with 
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[standard] conditions. .." (March 2,2006 Hearing Examiner Report, Record on 
First Appeal, 1655-56.) 
As is routine with development applications, the Hearing Examiner recommended certain 
conditions for approval-which KHD agreed to undertake-such as: 
KEJD would financially participate in the Highway 97 Route Development Plan 
planned by the Idaho Department of Transportation (ITD); 
Any construction on lots with slope greater than 25% would need a site-specific 
geotechnical engineering evaluation prior to approval of a building permit; 
Wetlands disturbances must comply with Army Corps of Engineers requirements. 
(March 2,2006 Hearing Examiner Report, Record on First Appeal, 1655-57.) 
After the approval recommendation from the Hearing Examiner, the BOCC held 
its public hearings. The heavily attended hearings2 were marked by hostile objections by 
groups of organizations and citizens on matters that did not relate to any of the 
administrative standards set forth in the County's zoning ordinance, but rather voiced 
objections that no new growth be allowed in the area. (Transcript of July 13,2006 
Proceedings, Record on First Appeal, Vol. 2). These objections were based on whether 
any development should be allowed on the property, as if KHD's application hearing 
involved a request for a Legislative discretionary rezoning. 
Furthermore, one member of the BOCC, Chairman Currie, visited the site without 
notice to--or authority from-the BOCC or KHD and conducted his own "traffic study" 
as an opponent to the application. At the hearing, Commissioner Currie stated: 
Highway 97. Umm, I did my own traffic study. I took a drive out 
there.. .I drove it twice. One very aggressively and I apology [sic] for that 
and one very conservatively. I and - I  had my stopwatch. I had to stop 
once to let - when I was aggressive, obviously, to let some cars get ahead 
of me so I could catch up again. But I also had to stop when I was driving 
The BOCC Chairman opened the July 13,2006 proceedings noting the large number of people in 
attendance, stating, "we do have a very, you can only wish the Seattle Mariners got this k i d  of crowd." 
(Transcript of July 13,2006 Proceedings, Record on First Appeal, 0206). 
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conservatively. Obviously, there was people are [sic] driving more 
conservatively than me. So I have major concerns urn with that. The 
capacity of - of - of the road was stated by the Highway District that it 
was not to capacity and it's, and it is not to capacity. But it's close. It is 
darn close to capacity.. .Highway 97 is what it is. And it's not good.. .I 
am going to jump back to IDT for a minute before I - before 1 complete 
my comments. Um, I am not going to approve another development when 
IDT says that um we will work this out later because IDT has some good 
rules and I agree with most of their rules but the problem being is once we 
approve it, then their rules change and we're left holding the bag and I'm 
not going to have that happen again. So, ah, so if you haven't ah got my 
drift, I am not going to support this development. 
(Transcript of July 27,2006 Proceedings, Record on First Appeal, 0394 - 96 (emphasis 
added).) Commissioner Currie did not abstain from the proceedings but vociferously 
opposed the project and voted against it. The Board impermissibly decided to adopt 
Commissioner Currie's study in place of the Idaho Transportation Department's study 
that found that the development met all traffic requirements. The BOCC's denial stated: 
The position of ITD was not supported by the public testimony or the 
personal experiences of the BOCC. As a body the BOCC has almost one- 
hundred and fifty years of experience living in Kootenai County. The 
members have, over the years, traveled Highway 97 for personal as well as 
professional reason [sic] both for the County and in private employment. 
It has been their personal experience that Highway 97 in its present state is 
not conducive to this increased level of development. (ROA, First Appeal, 
1966). 
The Board stated that "the single most relevant question is whether this project is 
appropriate for the location," ignoring the fact that the zoning allowed for more than 
twice as many residences to be built on the Iand. (BOCC August 24,2006 Report, 
Record on First Appeal, 1971). The BOCC denied KHD's application on August 24, 
KHD appealed the BOCC's decision to the District Court for the reasons stated 
herein. During the appeal, the parties engaged in mediation to determine if the matters 
could be resolved without continued litigation. Though KHD believed strongly in the 
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merits of its appeal, it desired to forego litigation in order to get the development on track 
and worked in good faith with the County to accomplish that goal. On January 19,2007, 
the parties entered into a Post-Mediation Agreement setting forth the BOCC's remaining 
concerns and offering a roadmap by which KHD could obtain approval at the conceptual 
stage. (Clerks' ROA, 387-388.) Pursuant to law, the Post-Mediation Agreement did not 
require the BOCC to approve KHD's second application, but the expressed intent was to 
narrow the issues that could be raised by the BOCC at the second hearing. KHD agreed 
to do the following: 
Modie the conceptual PUD plan to incorporate the requirement for an overpass 
of Highway 97, which subsequently received approval of all reviewing agencies 
including the Idaho Department of Transportation (ITD); 
Update the traffic impact studies to show that the effect of the development would 
not exceed the capacity of Highway 97 including peak hours of travel, which was 
approved by ITD and all reviewing agencies; 
Submit a preliminary subdivision plat which incorporated all of these changes. 
(Clerks' ROA, 387-388.) 
KHD voluntarily agreed to additional considerations to the County after the Post- 
Mediation Agreement was executed in order to further mitigate the BOCC's concerns: 
KHD agreed to dedicate land and build a fire station on the dedicated land; and 
KHD deleted a gasoline service station and retail to remove any non-residential 
uses alleged to be incompatible with the area. (ROA, Second Appeal, 171 6-171 8, 
2504-2506.) 
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KHD made the requested changes over the next few months, incurring substantial 
expense, and filed an amended PUD application and Preliminary Subdivision Application 
on March 14,2007. The second application, designated PUD 057-07, was substantially 
the same as the previous application, other than fulfilling the requirements and 
modifications that were agreed to by the parties in the Post-Mediation Agreement. 
The County's Planning Staff Report of August 23,2007 recommended approval 
with standard conditions. (County Planning Staff Report, Record on Second Appeal, 
2065-2301). Among other things, the Planning Staff Report found: 
"Based on zoning designations, the maximum potential number of residential lots 
for this site is approximately 1050 lots.. .[I]t should be noted that.. ..the proposal 
has reduced the maximum potential density to less than half of the potentially 
allowable dwelling units." 
"Currently, there is a mixed pattern of development in the area, including both 
sparsely developed rural areas as well as a large scale project that shares many of 
the same attributes as this proposal." 
"The proposal is compatible with the goals, policies and future land map of the 
Kootenai County Comprehensive Plan." 
"The proposal is consistent with the intent and purpose of this Title. The 
amenities, design, and benefits of the PUD justify any requested deviation from 
the normal requirements of this Title. Development of the PUD is in the best 
interest of the public." 
A public hearing was held before a newly appointed Hearing Examiner on August 
29,2007 and before the BOCC on December 6,2007. The hearings were marked by the 
same objections about whether new residential development was appropriate for the area 
and compatible with its natural characteristics. One nearby resident had concerns over 
the types of people who would reside in or visit the site, noting "parlicular concerns about 
the amount of drinking, and the police disturbances that arise from that.. ." (Clerk's 
ROA, 561). There was concern that the development was allegedly a known 
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archaeological sensitive area, but the County Planner admitted that the County had "no 
data." (Clerk's ROA, 557). Another resident representing a nearby Homeowners' 
Association in opposition to the project "stated that their concerns focused on safety on 
Highway 97, which cannot handle more traffic because of the grade.. ." despite the 
findings of ITD otherwise. (Clerk's ROA, 561 .) A representative of another 
Homeowner's Association testified in opposition because in the area, "the norm is 
development on 10+ acre lots." (Clerk's ROA, 562). A representative from the Kootenai 
Environmental Alliance "identified concerns related to traffic on Highway 97.. . [and] the 
incompatibility of the design with the area (noting that the proposed density far exceeds 
the density of the surrounding areas.. .)." (Clerk's ROA, 562). Many of the 
approximately 100 people present in opposition to the project submitted forms indicating 
their opposition, but chose not to testify. 
BOCC Chairman Cwrie also raised the same concerns about Highway 97's 
capacity that had already been rejected by ITD ("1 have major concerns with Highway 
97.. .and what happens to 97 in the Eutwe.. .if everybody from the east side of the lake 
came in today and wanted a building permit.. .that road just can't handle it.. .what do we 
tell those people down the line uh when the road does not handle it that could have gotten 
a building permit today.") (Clerk's ROA, 549). 
Gary Young, former Kootenai County Hearing Examiner, responded to each of 
these concerns on behalf of KHD. (Clerk's ROA, 563-564). He noted that KHD's relied 
on ITD's traffic engineers with regard to all concerns about the highway, that ITD's 
study indicated that traffic capacity on Highway 97 will be only 80% of capacity in 2022, 
and that KHD had indicated its willingness to financially participate in a study to identify 
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improvements and upgrades for the highway. Mr. Young testified that the project had 
undergone a thorough Comprehensive Plan analysis, and that the plan was not regulatory, 
unlike the zoning ordinance which regulates development. He noted that KHD had 
addressed concerns related to wetlands mitigation, wastewater treatment, emergency 
services, water supply, and slopes on the property. (Clerk's ROA, 563-564). 
But given the vocal opposition from the anti-development locals, the elected 
commissioners were determined to deny the project. The evidence reveals that the 
BOCC was swayed by the large numbers of the public who attended the hearings and 
requested that the applications be denied on the basis that the use was not compatible 
with the area, regardless ofthe zoning on the property. The brief filed by the Intervenors 
(among the more active anti-development area residents) makes clear that what the 
neighbors really wanted was a downzoning of the property: "Residents and 
environmental groups opposing developments in rural areas have been frustrated and 
often thwarted with the great latitude given by the Idaho appellate courts in affirming 
local government approval of developments disregarding overwhelming popular 
opposition." (Brief on Second Appeal of Intervenors, p. 2, Clerk's ROA 956 (emphasis 
added)). 
Despite the approval recommendation from the Planning Staff, both the second 
PUD application and Preliminary Subdivision Application were denied by the BOCC on 
December 20,2007, based on alleged incompatibility with new Comprehensive Plan 
goals that were not raised in the denial of KHD's first application or in the post mediation 
agreement. The BOCC found that "[allthough the project was deemed to be a good 
project it was determined that it was just not a good fit for the area." (Clerk's ROA, 
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565). The BOCC found that "[tlhe purpose of [the property's Comprehensive Plan 
designation] is to provide a 'country like' setting for residences," despite the fact that 
KHD applied for residences at less than half the allowable density in the zoning 
ordinance. (Clerk's ROA, 580). 
The BOCC devised entirely new impermissible legislative standards by which it 
chose to reject KHD's second application in order to appease the vocal anti-development 
segment of the community. The BOCC's decision never discusses the original approval 
recommendation from the Hearing Examiner or approval recommendation from the 
Planning Staff. The BOCC's decision instead finds that the development was "not 
compatible with the goals, policies and future land use map of the Kootenai County 
Compvehensive Plan." (Clerk's ROA, 581). The BOCC concluded that "[tlhe proposed 
development results in an overall higher density of development than is consistent with 
surrounding land use," despite the fact that KHD's application requested less than half 
the zoning ordinance's allowable density. (Clerk's ROA, 581). KHD has been left with 
no choice but to assert its rights by a second appeal. 
IV. Standard Of Review For Administrative Decisions 
On appeal from a decision of a district court, where the district court examines a 
county board's administrative decision, the Supreme Court independently reviews the 
BOCC's decision as if the case were directly appealed from the BOCC. Spencer v. 
Kootenai County, 145 Idaho 448,452 (2008); Cowan v. Bd of Comm'rs of Fremont 
County, 143 Idaho 501,508 (2006). The Supreme Court does "not give deference to the 
district court's decision." Idaho Power Co. v. Idaho State Tax Com 'n, 141 Idaho 3 16, 
321 (2005); HP Dunn & Son LP v. Teton County, 140 Idaho 808,810 (2004); Rincover v. 
State, Dept. ofFinance, Securities Bureau, 132 Idaho 547,549 (1999) (a "de novo" or 
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"standard of free review" applies). This Court is therefore tasked with reviewing the 
BOCC's denials of KHD's first and second applications on a de novo basis. 
The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act sets forth five separate circumstances 
where the decision of a county board must be overturned when the decision prejudices 
substantial rights of the appellant as follows: (a) when the decision is in violation of 
constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) when the decision is in excess of the statutory 
authority of the agency; (c) when the decision is made upon unlawful procedure; (d) 
when the decision is not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or 
(e) when the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. I.C. 5 67-5279(3) 
(Idaho Administrative Procedures Act); Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353, 357 
(2000); Application ofHayden Penes Water Co., 11 1 Idaho 331 (1986); Bone v. City of 
Lewiston, 107 Idaho 844 (1 984); Fevguson v. Board of County Commissioners, 1 10 Idaho 
626 (Idaho App. 1982); Crown Point Development, Inc. v. City of Sun Valley, 144 Idaho 
72,75 (2007); Love v. Bd. ofcounty Commissioners ofBingham County, 108 Idaho 728 
(1985) (the board of county commissioners' conclusion that a proposed change in zone 
classification was in accordance with the intent and policy of the comprehensive plan of 
the county was not a finding fact, but rather a conclusion of law that could be corrected 
on judicial review). As set forth herein, each of these circumstances is present in the 
BOCC's first and second decisions. 
V. The Lower Court's Decision Was Arbitrary, Capricious, And Discriminatory 
As A Matter Of Law Because The Court Essentially Granted The BOCC 
Legislative Discretionary Review Rather Than Administrative, Quasi- 
Judicial Review 
It is undisputed that the BOCC acts in a quasi-judicial capacity when it considers 
whether to approve or deny applications for subdivisions and PUDs. "A decision by a 
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zoning board applying general rules or specific policies to specific individuals, interests 
or situations, are quasi-judicial in nature and subject to due process constraints." 
Chambers v. Kootenai County Bd. ofComm'rs, 125 Idaho 115,118 (1994) (applying 
zoning rules to specific applications is quasi-judicial); Cowan v. Bd of Comm 'rs of 
Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501 (2006); Cooper v. Board ofcounty Comm'rs ofAda 
County, 101 Idaho 407,411 (1980). Other jurisdictions also follow the same rule. Board 
of County Corn 'rs ofBrevard County v. Snyder, 627 So.2d 469 (Fla. 1993); Neuberger v. 
City ofportland, 603 P.2d 771 (Ore. 1979); Fasano v. Board of County Com 'rs of 
Washington County, 507 P.2d 23 (Ore. 1973). Characterization of the PUD approval 
process as quasi-judicial requires reviewing courts to scrutinize the merits of a grant or 
denial more closely. See Ziegler, The Law of Zoning and Planning. §40:25, p. 40-59 
(2005 ed.). 
Neither the BOCC, nor any individual Commissioner, is allowed to advocate 
approval or denial of the application. "When acting upon a quasi-judicial zoning matter 
the governing board is neither a proponent nor an opponent of the proposal at issue, but 
sits instead in the seat of a judge." Marcia I: Turner, LLC v. City of Twin Falls, 144 
Idaho 203, 159 P. 3d 840, 846 (2007). "In this context, the Due Process Clause would 
therefore apply to the zoning board in the same way that it applies to judges." Id.; See 
also Richard Epstein, Coniston Corp. v. Village ofHofSnzan Hills: How to Make 
Procedural Due Process Disappear, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1689 (2007) (discussing how it is 
a procedural due process violation to treat administrative actions requiring due process 
protection as legislative actions that give the local agency unbridled discretion). 
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A. The Findings Of The BOCC Were Legislative In Nature Instead Of 
Ouasi-Judicial And Effectively Acted As An Im~ermissible Legislative 
Rezoning Of The Propertv 
This is not a scenario, as the District Court's decision implies, where the decision 
should be left to the legislative judgment of the local agency, such as a zoning decision 
where a legislative action is contemplated by the BOCC. On the contrary, here the 
BOCC had previously made the zoning decision in its legislative capacity when it placed 
the property in the Restricted Residential zone permitting five lots per acre, and the Rural 
zone permitting one lot per five acres, allowing at least 999 residential homes on the 
property. K.C.C. §§ 9-8-3,9-13-3. The BOCC now was left only with the quasi-judicial 
task of approving applications of landowners whose applications were in conformity with 
the zoning ordinance. See Floyd v. Klein, 765 N.E. 632,646 (Ind. App. 2002) ("[tshe 
plan commission's only task when reviewing [a developer's] application.. .[is] to 
determine whether the proposed plat complied with the concrete standards set out in the 
subdivisions control ordinance.. ."). The BOCC has no discretion to deny applications 
based on considerations other than the applicable zoning ordinance. Id. ("the Plan 
Commission's denial of [the developer's] application on the basis of factors outside the 
ordinance was erroneous"). The BOCC is not acting as a "mini-legislature" when it 
reviews quasi-judicial development applications. Albuquerque Commons Partnership v. 
City ofAlbuquerque, 184 P.3d 41 1,422 (N.M. 2008); see also Southern Cooperative 
Development Fund v. Driggers, 696 F. 2d 1347, 1352 (1 lth Cir. 1983) (finding that since 
the landowner had complied with the county's subdivision regulations, the county 
commission had the administrative duty to approve the landowner's proposed plat and 
their refusal to do so was a violation of the landowner's guarantee of due process). 
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These requirements are in place so that uniform results are reached no matter who 
applies to the local zoning board for developmental approval. "All persons similarly 
situated should be able to obtain plat approval upon meeting uniform standards. 
Otherwise the official approval of a plat application would depend upon the whim or 
caprice of the public body involved." Bvoward County v. Narco Realty, 359 So.2d 509 
(Fla.App.1978). A planning commission acting in its administrative capacity has no 
discretion or choice but to approve a subdivision if it conforms to regulations adopted for 
its guidance. Reed v. Planning and Zoning Commission of Town of Chester, 544 A.2d 
1213 (Conn. 1988); PTL, LLC v. Chisago County Bd. of Com'rs, 656 N.W.2d 567 (Minn. 
App. 2003) (a county board of commissioners lacks legal authority to deny a real estate 
developer's application for approval of a preliminary plat, where plat proposed a 
permitted use and complied with regulatory standards prescribed by that use). 
When a subdivision ordinance specifies standards to which a proposed plat must 
conform, it is arbitrary as a matter of law to deny approval of a plat which complies with 
the subdivision ordinance. Ode11 v. City of Eagan, 348 N.W.2d 792 (Minn. App. 1984); 
State ex rel Daniel D. Rappa, Inc. v. Buck, 275 A.2d 795 (Del. Super. 1971) (a county 
council has no discretion but to approve a plan if the plan conforms to the subdivision 
regulations); Sherman v. City of Colorado Springs Planning Commission, 680 P.2d 1302 
(Colo. App. 1983) (where a proposed use was permitted, the city council exceeded its 
jurisdiction when it rejected a development plan that complied with the zoning 
provisions). 
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B. The BOCC's Findings Were Impermissibly Based On Alleged 
Incompatibility With the Surrounding Area In Lieu Of The 
Applicable Zoning Ordinance That Already Established 
Compatibility 
The BOCC's findings were based on compatibility with the surrounding area in 
lieu of the applicable zoning ordinance provisions and standards already establishing the 
entitlement for the Planned Unit Development and subdivision approvals as being 
compatible with the area, resulting in an impermissible rezoning of the property. The 
principal finding of the BOCC that KHD's project is incompatible with the surrounding 
area effectively rezones the property, as the uses permitted by the zoning ordinance in 
place are no longer permitted because they are allegedly incompatible. See Urrutia v. 
Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353,357-358 (2000); Sanders Orchard v. Gem County ex rel. 
Bd. of County Comm%s, 137 Idaho 695,699 (2002). 
In Connecticut, the designation of a particular use of property as a conditional use 
establishes a presumption that such use does not adversely affect the zoning district and 
precludes further inquiry into its effect on traffic, municipal services, or general 
harmony of district. Havurah v. Zoning Bd. ofAppeals of Town ofNorfolk, 418 A.2d 
82 (Conn. 1979); Sowin Associates v. Planning and Zoning Commission of Town of South 
Windsor, 580 A.2d 91 (Conn. App. 1990); Lord Family of Windsor, LLC v. Planning and 
Zoning Commission of Town of Windsor, 954 A.2d 831,837 (Conn. 2008); Pansy Road, 
LLC v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission, 926 A.2d 1029 (Conn. 2007). In Sowin 
Associates, because the land was located in a residential zone and the applicant's plan 
was to use the property for residential purposes, the commission "could not weigh offsite 
traffic concerns.. .or the general harmony of the district when deciding whether the 
approve the plaintiffs subdivision application." The court specifically distinguished the 
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situation where there was a pending development application from other cases involving 
requests for rezoning where other factors such as harmony of the district and offsite 
traffic considerations were permitted. 
Other jurisdictions follow the same logic. See State ex rel. Schaefer v. Cleveland, 
847 S.W.2d 867 (Mo. App. 1992) (a developer's plan may not be disapproved on grounds 
of incompatibility with the neighborhood); Reynolds v. City Council of Longmont, 680 
P.2d 1350 (Colo. App. 1984) (when subdivision plat satisfied zoning regulations, 
governing body had no discretion to deny the plat); Smith v. Mobile, 374 So.2d 305 (Ala. 
1979) (where planning comnission disapproved on grounds that it was out of character 
with other lots in the area, the disapproval was improper); Pizzo Mantin Group v. 
Township of Randolph, 645 A.2d 89 (N.J. 1994) (denial of preliminary plat can only be 
based on standards in municipal subdivision ordinances and not on broad statutory 
purposes). 
Here, there is no request for rezoning. The zoning ordinance is already in place 
and allows the PUD and subdivision that were applied for by KHD. Consideration of any 
other factors was already made by ihe BOCC in their legislative capacity at the time 
when the property was zoned. It is impermissible to reconsider these other factors at the 
quasi-judicial stage where KHD's applications are exa~nined.~ 
If Kootenai County had desired to keep the area rural, this is something that could have been 
accomplished by the County at the stage when the zoning ordinances were enacted-not after landowners 
have incnrred expense and followed the zoning ordinances in order to develop their property. There are 
resources that Kootenai County could have used in order to keep the rural character of the area. See 
Randall Arendt, Rural by Design: Maintaining Small Town Character (Cambridge, Mass., Lincoln Land 
Institute, American Planning Ass'n 1994). 
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C. The District Court Failed To Recognize That The BOCC's Denial 
Based On Alleged Non-Conformance With The Comprehensive Plan 
Is Not Permitted Under Idaho Law 
In its denial of KHD's applications, the BOCC relied principally upon the 
applications' alleged non-compliance with general goals laid out in Icootenai County's 
Comprehensive PIan. The District Court approved the BOCC's methods. Doing so was 
legal error. 
A comprehensive plan does not serve the purpose of acting as a legal standard that 
quasi-judicial development applications are analyzed against. The Comprehensive PIan 
contains a list of general goals, which are too vague for a developer or a quasi-judicial 
board to use in order to determine whether a particular application meets the express 
written standards of the zoning and subdivision ordinance. The Hearing Examiner 
reviewing KHD's first application recognized this, recommending approval of the 
application because it met the requirements in the zoning ordinance; the Comprehensive 
Plan was not the proper standard since the application was not requesting a change in 
zoning. (ROA, First Appeal, 1655.) As detailed below, use of a comprehensive plan in 
this manner effectively gives a reviewing board unbridled legislative discretion when 
reviewing specific applications-a situation that Idaho law, as well as land use law 
around the nation, clearly does not permit. 
It is well-established in Idaho that "a comprehensive plan does not operate as 
legally controlling zoning law, but rather serves to guide and advise the governmental 
agencies responsible for making zoning decisions." Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 
353, 357-358 (2000); Giltner Dairy, LLC v. Jerome County, 145 Idaho 630 (2008); Evans 
v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71,76 (2003); Balser v. Kootenai County Bd. of Cornrn'rs, 
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110 Idaho 37 (1986); Friends of Farm to Market v. Valley County, 137 Idaho 192,200 
(2002). The governing board of a county cannot deny a use that is specifically permitted 
by a zoning ordinance on the ground that such use would conflict with a generalized goal 
of a comprehensive plan; a comprehensive plan reflects the desirable goals and 
objectives, or desirable future situations for the land within a jurisdiction, but it does not 
operate as a legally controlling zoning law. Sanders Orchard v. Gem County ex rel. Bd. 
of County Comm'rs, 137 Idaho 695,699 (2002) ("[tlhe governing board cannot, however, 
deny a use that is specifically permitted by the zoning ordinance on the ground that such 
use would conflict with the comprehensive plan"). 
Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353 (2000), is instructive here. In Urrutia, 
this Co& held that the Blaine County Board of Commissioners' decision to deny a 
developer's application "was improper in that the Board placed inappropriate emphasis 
upon the subdivision's non-compliance with the Comprehensive Plan." Urrutia v. Blaine 
County, 134 Idaho 353,356 (2000). Blaine County's ordinance, like Kootenai County's 
ordinance, stated that the development application should conform to the goals and 
policies of the comprehensive plan. In Urrutia, this Court held that: 
It is to be expected that the land to be subdivided may not agree with all 
provisions in the comprehensive plan, but a more specific analysis, 
resulting in denial of a subdivision application based solely on non- 
compliance with the comprehensive plan elevates the plan to the level of 
legally controlling zoning law. Such a result affords the Board 
unbounded discretion in examining a subdivision application and allows 
the Board to effectively re-zone land based on the general language in 
the comprehensive plan. As indicated above, the comprehensive plan is 
intended merely as a guideline whose primary use is in guiding zoning 
decisions. 
Urruria v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353,358-359 (2000) (emphasis added). This is 
precisely the same legislative "unbounded discretion" with which the BOCC is acting in 
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the instant case. This Court has already disapproved of a county commission's authority 
to deny a developer's application based upon alleged non-compliance with the general 
goals of the comprehensive plan. 
Two years after Urrutia, this Court's decision in Sanders Orchard v. Gem County 
was even more specific: 
The Subdivision Ordinance's requirement that the Board consider the 
'conformance of the subdivision with the Comprehensive Plan' does not 
incorporate by reference all of the provisions of the Comprehensive Plan 
into the Subdivision Ordinance ... The governing board cannot [I deny a 
use that is specifically permitted by the zoning ordinance on the ground 
that such use would conflict with the comprehensive plan. 
Sanders Orchard v. Gem County ex rel. Bd. of County Comm 'us, 137 Idaho 695,699 
(2002). KHD's first and second applications comply with the zoning ordinance. The 
Hearing Examiner and the staff of the Planning Department recognized this. The BOCC 
impermissibly denied the first and second PUD and subdivision applications on the 
ground that they allegedly conflicted with the Comprehensive Plan. 
Since KHD was not requesting a change in zoning, using the Comprehensive Plan 
was not the proper standard. In Pennsylvania, discretioilary uses are treated as 
presumptively valid because the inclusion of such use in an ordinance establishes that the 
proposed use is consistent with the comprehensive plan. Northampton Area School 
Distvict v. East Allen Township Board of Supervisors, 824 A.2d 372,376 (Pa. Commw.), 
appeal denied, 575 Pa. 689,834 A. 2d 1144 (Pa. 2003). A "conditional use must be 
granted" unless the local board acting in its administrative capacity can establish that 
there is a "high degree of probability of a substantial threat to the community." In re 
Cutler G~oup, Inc., 880 A.2d 39,43 (Pa. Commw. 2005). Even when the local 
ordinances require that the proposed use must be "suitable with respect to probable 
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effects upon highway traffic," a local board cannot deny apermit because the proposed 
use would exacerbate an already dangerous traffic condition. Id. 
In Washington, the alleged noncompliance of a proposed preliminary plat with the 
comprehensive plan does not support the denial of the application, since the 
inconsistency between the zoning ordinance and comprehensive plan must be resolved by 
application of the ordinance. Nagatani Bros., Inc. v. Skagit County Bd. of Com'rs, 739 
P.2d 696 (Wash. 1987). 
In Florida, the Eleventh Circuit found that the preamble to a county's subdivision 
regulations, wherein the county reserved discretion to provide for the general health, 
safety and welfare, but which contained no standard with respect to subdivision approval, 
could not serve as an independent source of authority for the commission to disapprove 
subdivision plat. Southern Cooperative Development Fund v. Driggers, 696 F.2d 1347 
(I lth Cir. 1983). Because the landowner had complied with the subdivision regulations 
in place at the time the application was filed, the county commission had administrative 
duty to approve the plat, and its refusal to do so was a violation of landowners' guarantee 
of due process. Id. 
Here, the BOCC had impermissibly and legislatively changed the zoning on the 
property after the quasi-judicial application had been submitted. 
1. The Goals Of A comprehensive Plan Are Not Intended To Be 
Instructive To Landowners Developing Their Properties 
The BOCC, on its second denial, added five new general comprehensive plan 
goals not raised at the first hearing nor in the Post-Mediation Agreement. In the first 
hearing the BOCC raised only incompatibility with Goals 7 and 14 of the Comprehensive 
Plan, which were addressed in the Post-Mediation Agreement and were not to be further 
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considered in the second hearing. Despite the Post-Mediation Agreement, the BOCC 
found that KFID's proposed development was not consistent with Goals 4,7,9,  14, 17,23 
and 24 of the Comprehensive Plan. Goal 4 is to "lplreserve, protect, and enhance the 
water quality and quantity of lakes, streams, rivers and wetlands in Kootenai County." 
Goal 7 is to "[plrevent or limit development activity in hazardous areas." Goal 9 is to 
"[dlevelop land use regulations that protect property rights, maintain quality of life, 
provide adequate land for development, buffer non-compatible land uses, and protect the 
environment." Goal 14 is to "[plrovide for the efficient, safe, and cost-effective 
movement of people and goods." Goal 17 is to "[elnsure efficient and effective police, 
fire, and emergency services." Goal 23 is to "[dlevelop quality County parks, greenbelts, 
and recreation facilities to meet the diverse needs of a growing population." Goal 24 is to 
"[slecure waterfront and near-shore areas for beneficial public uses and enhance public 
enjoyment of a growing population." 
The BOCC's decision on KHD's application is precisely the situation that the 
Urrutia and Sanders Orchard decisions sought to avoid. If the BOCC were allowed to 
approve or reject KHD's PUD or subdivision applications based upon alleged general 
violations of the goals of the Comprehensive Plan, the BOCC could consider public 
opposition based on the general, vague goals contained in the Comprehensive Plan, 
exactly what has occurred in this case. Meanwhile, landowners would be trapped in a 
situation where they are offered no ascertainable standards nor guidance with respect to 
the parameters to which their quasi-judicial development application should conform in 
order to be approved; instead, each application would be left to the legislative whims of 
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the BOCC depending on which way the political winds were blowing on that particular 
day. 
If the BOCC is concerned with implementing the goals of the Comprehensive 
Plan, the proper procedure is to work in its legislative capacity to amend the county's 
zoning ordinances to incorporate Comprehensive Plan goals into legally sound, specific 
standards. Under Idaho law, and indeed the laws of nearly all jurisdictions, the BOCC 
cannot use the general language of the Comprehensive Plan as a tool to deny individual 
quasi-judicial applications that otherwise comply with the current standards of zoning 
ordinances. The District Court thus erred when it approved the BOCC's use of the 
general goals of the Comprehensive Plan as the sole basis for denying KHD's second 
PUD and subdivision applications, and the primary basis for denial of the first PUD 
application. 
2. Idaho Law Is Consisent With Sational Law Establishing That 
Developers Are Entitled To I'nclcrstand What They Must Do 
In Order To Obtain Quasi-Judicial Approval To Develoa 
Their Land 
"Developers are entitled to know with reasonable clarity what they must do under 
state or local land use control laws to obtain the permits or approvals they seek." 
Kosalka v. Town of Georgetown, 752 A.2d 183, 186 (Me. 2000); see also Ziegler, The 
Law of Zoning and Planning. §40:25, p. 40-59 (2005 ed.) (the criteria must be objective); 
South of Sunnyside Neighborhood League v. Board of Com'rs of Clackamas County, 569 
P.2d 1063 (Ore. 1977). Zoning ordinances must be precise, definite and certain in 
expression so as to enable both the landowner and municipality to act with assurance and 
authority regarding local quasi-judicial land use decisions. Evansville Outdoor 
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Advertising, Inc. v. Princeton (City) Plan Corn 'n, 849 N.E.2d 630 (Ind. App. 2006).~ 
"Zoning ordinances must be specific enough to limit arbitrary and discretionary 
enforcement of the law." Cingular Wireless, LLC v. Thurston County, 129 P.3d 300,3 10 
(Wash. App. 2006). "In the land use area, we look not only at the face of the ordinance 
but also at how it applies to the person who has sought to comply with the ordinance 
andlor who is alleged to have failed to comply." Id. 
Here, there is nothing vague about Kootenai County's zoning ordinance and 
density requirements-development of a PUD such as that contemplated by KWD's 
applications is clearly permitted. But the manner in which the zoning ordinances were 
applied by the BOCC in this case-particularly the use of the vague individual 
comprehensive plan goals as a hurdle-lends absolutely no precision or clarity to the 
process and leaves landowners with no definite guidelines to know how their property 
can be developed. The use of the vague Comprehensive Plan goal standards by the 
BOCC impermissibly leaves each individual application up to the whims of the BOCC. 
D. The District Court Failed To Give Proper Weight To The Hearing 
Examiner's Recommendation For Approval 
The District Court also failed to apply the proper weight that should have been 
granted to the first Hearing Examiner's findings and recommendation for approval. 
Where an agency's findings disagree with those of the hearing panel, the Court should 
scrutinize the agency's findings more critically. Pearl v. Board ofProfessiona1 
Discipline of Idaho State Bd. Of Medicine, 137 Idaho 107, 112 (2002). 
A statute is unconstitutionally vague when its language does not convey sufficiently definite 
warnings as to the proscribed conduct, and its language is such that men of common intelligence 
must necessarily guess at its meaning. Wyckoffv. Boardof Cozdnty Com'rs ofAda County, 101 
Idaho 12, 13 (1980). 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF-Page 29 
34223.1 
The first Hearing Examiner examined ICEID'S application without influence from 
the vocal segments of the community aid recommended approval. (March 2,2006 
Hearing Examiner Report, Record on First Appeal, 1640-57.) The Hearing Examiner 
found that KHD's proposed conceptual PUD was in compliance with the applicable 
zoning ordinance, was consistent with the intent and purpose of the ICootenai County 
Zoning Ordinance, and that the proposed development was consistent with surrounding 
uses and natural characteristics of the area. In its opinion, the District Court never even 
mentioned that the Hearing Examiner recommended approval of KHD's original PUD 
application. 
VI. The District Court Failed To Pro~erly  C:oiisider Or Applv Equitable 
Estopl)el To l'he BOCC's Actions At The Second Public Aearilig 
The District Court's opinion failed to properly recognize that the BOCC was 
equitably estopped in its decision on KHD's second applications for Planned Unit 
Development and subdivision approval from raising issues that were not addressed upon 
the denial of KHD's first application or in the Post-Mediation Agreement. The BOCC 
cannot introduce new issues or standards with respect to whether KHD's second 
application is in compliance with Comprehensive Plan goals. Upon KHD's first 
application, the BOCC's decision stated that the application complied with all goals 
except Nos. 7 and 14. The parties went through court-ordered mediation and entered into 
a Post-Mediation Agreement setting forth the specific requirements of the BOCC in order 
for the developmental application to be reviewed. The Post-Mediation Agreement forms 
the basis for the principle of equitable estoppel against introducing new alleged 
compliance deficiencies based on the five newly asserted Comprehensive Plan goals. 
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In the Post-Mediation Agreement, the BOCC and KHD identified the specific 
actions that IMD would take prior to its second development application.5 First, the 
parties agreed that all proposed building sites would be in compliance with federal, state 
and local laws and regulations, including those applicable to building on slopes. (Clerk's 
ROA, 387.) Second, the parties agreed that any disturbance of wetlands would occur 
only as permitted pursuant to federal, state and local regulations and permitting, including 
those of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. (Clerk's ROA, 387.) Third, KHD agreed to 
various actions to help mitigate the effects of the development on Highway 97, including: 
(1) running construction traffic at non-peak hours as determined by the Idaho 
Transportation Department ("ITD"), (2) constructing a permanent overpass/underpass 
across Highway 97 to be approved by ITD, and (3) financially participating in studies of 
traffic mitigation on Highway 97. (Clerk's ROA, 387-388.) 
Despite these requirements being met by KHD, the BOCC introduced five new 
goals of the Comprehensive Plan which it alleged the second application was 
incompatible with. (Clerk's ROA, 581.) The BOCC cannot raise alleged deficiencies 
that it agreed in the Post-Mediation Agreement would not be considered where the 
applicant has relied upon in good faith by staying its appeal and incurring major 
expenditures as it has done here. The doctrine of equitable estoppel prevents the County 
from doing so. 
In a case almost identical to the present situation, where the court remanded an 
application back to the administrative agency for a second review, the agency was held to 
The District Court noted during the February 22,2008 hearing that "[tlhere also was a second portion [of 
the Post-Mediation Agreement] which made reference to Idaho Code 5 67-65 19(4)(c) that provided 
essentially that the parties agree to and hereby identify the actions that the Appellant, Kirk-Hughes 
Development, can take to obtain permit approval of the PUD." Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, 
February 22,2008, Case No. CV-08-163. 
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be estopped from raising new issues, objectives, and compatibility deficiencies. See 
Floyd v. Klein, 765 N.E. 632,641 (Ind. App. 2002) ("[all1 of the asserted defects in a plat 
must be identified at one time, and a plan commission may not raise asserted defects in a 
piecemeal fashion"). 
Courts of other states have applied estoppel to new or amended regulations where 
the applicant has made a substantial investment in good faith reliance on the ordinances 
in place at the time of application. Henry & Murphy, Znc. v. Allenstown, 424 A.2d 1132 
(N.H. 1980); American National Bankv. City of Chicago, 31 1 N.E.2d 325 (Ill. App. 
1974). Idaho courts follow this line of thinking as well. Where a landowner, in reliance 
on an existing zoning regulation, makes substantial expenditures before the zoning 
regulation is changed, the landowner is protected from the local government's "ever- 
evolving" position. See Boise City v. Blasei; 98 Idaho 789,791 (1 977); City o f L e ~ ~ i s f o n  
v. Bergamo, 119 Idaho 221,225 (Idaho App., 1991); Chisholm v. Twin Falls County, 139 
Idaho 13 1, 134- 135 (2003); Canal/Norcrest/Columbus Action Committee v. City ofBoise, 
137 Idaho 377 (2002). 
This is analogous to the situation where a county board cannot prevent a 
landowner from receiving approval for an otherwise valid application by changing zoning 
law after the application is submitted; a county board similarly cannot enter into a Post- 
Mediation Agreement spelling out the alleged deficiencies of an application only to deny 
the application again after the alleged deficiencies have been resolved at substantial 
expense to the landowner by asserting objections that were not raised upon the first 
application's denial or in the Post-Mediation Agreement. 
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A. The District Court Erred As A Matter Of Law BY Using. A Fraudulent 
Esto~pel Standard Instead Of The Equitable Esto~pel Standard 
The District Court erroneously used a fraudulent estoppel standard when 
analyzing whether the BOCC was estopped from going beyond the alleged deficiencies 
set out in the first application denial and subsequent Post-Mediation Agreement. (District 
Court Amended Opinion at p. 24, Clerk's ROA, 1109.) Instead of relying on a fraudulent 
estoppel standard that is based on a misrepresentation of fact, the District Court should 
have looked at the established Idaho and national doctrine of equitable estoppel based on 
the affirmative acts, words or deeds of a municipality. The Florida Supreme Court has 
succinctly laid out the doctrine: 
[Tlhe doctrine of equitable estoppel will preclude a municipality from 
exercising its zoning power where a property owner (1) in good faith (2) 
upon some act or omission of the government (3) has made such a 
substantial change in position or has incurred such extensive obligations 
and expenses that it would be highly inequitable and unjust to destroy the 
right he acquired. 
HollywoodBeach Hotel Co. v. City of Hollywood, 329 So.2d 10, 15 (Fla. 1976). The 
doctrine of equitable estoppel is not based upon the necessity of a fraudulent 
representation of fact by the municipality. "A court will preclude a municipality from 
changing its regulations as they apply to a particular parcel of land when a property 
owner in good faith, upon some act [I of the government, has made such a substantial 
change in position or has incurred such extensive obligations and expenses that it would 
be highly inequitable and unjust to destroy the right that he acquired." Florida 
Companies v. Orange County, 41 1 So. 2d 1008, 1010 (Fla. App. 1982). 
"Estoppel differs from vested rights in that estoppel is based on the representation 
by government.. .and on the developer's good faith reliance upon that representation." 
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James Kushner, 2 Subdivision Law and Growth Mgmt. 5 10:2 (2008). As written by land 
use expert David Heeter: 
The defense of estoppel is derived from equity, but the defense of vested rights 
reflects principles of common and constitutional law. Similarly, their elements 
are different. Estoppel focuses upon whether it would be inequitable to allow the 
government to repudiate its prior conduct; vested rights focuses upon whether the 
owner acquired real property rights which cannot be taken away by governmental 
regulation. 
Heeter, Zoning Estoppel: Application of the Principles of Equitable Esloppel and Vested 
Rights to Zoning Disputes, 1971 Urb. L. Ann. 63,64-65; see also Charles Siemon, 
Wendy Larsen & Douglas Porter, Vested Rights-Balancing Public and Private 
Development Expectations 49 (1982), 
In Town ofLargo v. Imperial Homes, 309 So. 2d 571, 573 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1975), the court analyzed the equitable estoppel doctrine as follows: 
[Tlhe theory of estoppel amounts to nothing more than an application of 
the rules of fair play. One party will not be permitted to invite another 
onto a welcome mat and then be permitted to snatch the mat away to the 
detriment of the party induced or permitted to stand thereon. A citizen is 
entitled to rely on the assurances and commitments of a zoning authority 
and if he does, the zoning authority is bound by its representations, 
whether they be in the form of words or deeds.. . 
In the present situation, the BOCC entered into the Post-Mediation Agreement 
knowing that KHD would suspend its appeal and incur substantial expense to implement 
its terms. The BOCC is equitably estopped from denying KHD's application on any 
basis other than those issues raised in the original denial of KHD's application or in the 
post-mediation that resulted therefrom. 
B. The Post-.?ledintiorr Agreement \Vas Not .An Agrccnlcnt To Approve 
The Proiect, But Narrowed The Issues Tlint Could Be Raised 
The BOCC emphasized in its denial of KHD's second application-and argued in 
its filings with the District Court-that the Post-Mediation Agreement could not grant a 
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guarantee of approval in violation of the principles of contract zoning. KHD agrees. The 
BOCC's argument misses the point. The purpose of the Post-Mediation Agreement was 
to clarify the issues in KHD's development application that the BOCC believed were not 
in compliance with the zoning ordinance so that these issues could he addressed by KHD 
at the second hearing. The intent was to confine the issues to be raised upon KHD's 
second application to those agreed to in the Post-Mediation Agreement. 
This is not contract zoning. These types of agreements are routinely permitted. 
See Castle Ifomes and Development, Inc. v. City of Brier, 882 P.2d 1172 (Wash. 1994) 
(city entered into voluntary agreement so equitable estoppel applies); Batakis v. Town of 
Belmont, 607 A.2d 956 (N.H. 1992) (notice from planning board stating that proposal 
would be reviewed under site plan standards estopped the board from abruptly changing 
its decision and applying alternative subdivision standards). 
"Specific statements or representations, including agreements and informal 
actions, of govermnent officials inducing a property owner to rely thereon and materially 
change his position are sufficient government acts for the application of equitable 
estoppel." Craig Janslow, Understanding the Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel in Florida, 
38 U. Miami L. Rev. 187,211 (1984). Here, the BOCC and KHD negotiated and agreed 
upon the issues that remained. The BOCC was authorized to enter into this agreement. 
See Congregation Etz Chaim v. City ofLos Angeles, 371 F. 3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2004); 
Monell v. Dept. ofsocial Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658,690-692 (1978). 
Equitable estoppel prevents the BOCC from choosing not to honor the terms of its duly 
authorized agreement. 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF-Page 35 
34223.1 
C. KHD Relied U-pon The Countv's Action 
The BOCC knew that KND would rely on the Post-Mediation Agreement as the 
definitive roadmap towards approval of KHD's application. KHD spent substantial 
amounts of time and expenditures over the next few months working to shape its second 
PUD and first preliminary subdivision application so that the BOCC's concerns would be 
adequately addressed. In fact, the County Planning Staff recommended approval of the 
second applications based on compliance with all applicable issues raised in the first 
hearing and the Post-Mediation Agreement. (ROA, Second Appeal, 2065-2301 .) In 
reliance on the BOCC's agreement, KHD also agreed to suspend its appeal of the 
BOCC's denial of KHD's first application. 
Equitable estoppel applies in situations where a local government makes a 
representation, including agreements and other informal actions, that induce a property 
owner to rely thereon and materially change his position. City of Naples v. Crans, 292 
So.2d 58 (Fla. 2nd Dist. 1974); see also Killearn Properties, Inc. v. Cily of Tallahassee, 
366 So.2d 172 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1979) (equitable estoppel can be invoked even without the 
expenditure of a single dollar); Abbeville Arms v. City ofAbbeville, 257 S.E.2d 716 (N.C. 
1979) (government was equitably estopped from denying permit where $100,000 was 
spent in reliance on zoning compatibility based on defective zoning map); City of Berea 
v. Wren, 818 S.W.2d 274 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991) (property owner in good faith relied upon 
erroneously issued permit); Clackamas Counly v. Holmes, 508 P.2d 190 (Ore. 1973) 
(relaxed substantial reliance test applying equitable factors); Janslow, 38 U. Miami L. 
Rev. at 213 ("[algreements and oral contracts reached with local governments will also 
suffice as government acts"). A developer must be able to rely on a local government's 
statement of an application's deficiencies; the government cannot assert deficiencies on a 
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piecemeal basis once the developer has relied on the government's position. Equicor 
Development, Inc. v. Westfield- Waskington Tp. Plan Corn 'n, 758 N.E.2d 34 (Ind. 2001) 
(developer reasonably relied on the absence of parking problem that had never been 
raised before the commission's vote on the application, so commission was estopped 
from asserting this deficiency as a reason to deny approval); Harrison County v. Aulbach, 
748 N.E.2d 926 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (commission may not impose condition where the 
subject of the condition has not previously been addressed during 10-month application 
consideration period); Floyd v. Klein, 765 N.E. 632,641 (Ind. App. 2002); Relay Imp. 
Ass 'n v. Sycamore Realty Co., Inc., 661 A.2d 182 (Md. App. 1995). 
The principle of governmental equitable estoppel is properly invoked here to 
prohibit the BOCC from denying KHD's second application based upon new 
Comprehensive Plan goals after KHD incurred substantial expense in reasonable and 
good faith reliance on the Post-Mediation Agreement, which the parties intended to be a 
roadmap toward project approval. "[Ilf a plan commission fails to apprise a developer of 
asserted defects in a plat following a hearing, the commission may be estopped from 
denying an application for plat approval on the basis of those asserted defects following a 
subsequent hearing." Floyd v. Klein, 765 N.E. 632,641 (Ind. App. 2002). It is 
inequitable to deprive KHD of the right to complete the development as proposed after 
incurring expenses in reliance on the BOCC's execution of the Post-Mediation 
Agreement. 
D. The BOCC Engaged in Unfair Dealings 
"Unfair dealing by a municipality can also serve as the basis for the invokement 
of equitable estoppel." Hollywood Beach Hotel Co. v. City ofIToIlywood, 329 So.2d 10, 
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18 (Fla. 1976). Here, the BOCC unfairly dealt with the landowner as they entered into a 
'4 
Post-Mediation Agreement, convinced the landowner to suspend its appeal of the 
BOCC's original denial, asked the landowner to make substantial expenditures based on 
the agreement, and then never gave the landowner a fair shake when it submitted its 
second application. 
VII. KHD's Procedural And Substantive Due Process Rights Were Violated By 
The BOCC; The District Court Erred As A Matter Of Law In Refusing To 
Find Due Process Violations Where The BOCC's Actions Relied On An 
Unsupported And Unrelated Political Outcry, Ex Parte Communications, 
Unauthorized Site Visits And Personal Studies By BOCC Members 
The BOCC's denial of KHD's applications must be reversed because the denials 
were in total violation of KHD's entitlement to due process. "When acting upon a quasi- 
judicial zoning matter the governing board is neither proponent nor an opponent of the 
proposal at issue, but sits instead in the seat of the judge." Marcia I: Turner, LLC 17. City 
of Twin Falls, 144 Idaho 203, 159 P. 3d 840, 846 (2007). "In this context, the Due 
Process Clause would therefore apply to the zoning board in the same way that it applies 
to judges." Id. 
It is undisputed that the BOCC acts in a quasi-judicial and not legislative capacity 
when it considers whether to approve or deny applications for subdivisions and PUDs. 
"A decision by a zoning board applying general rules or specific policies to specific 
individuals, interests, or situations, [is] quasi-judicial in nature and subject to due process 
constraints." Chambers v. Kootenai County Bd Of Comm 'rs, 125 Idaho 11 5,118 (1994); 
Cowan v. Bd Of Cornm 'rs of~remont  County, 143 Idaho 501 (2006); Cooper v. Board of 
County Comm'rs ofAda County; 101 Idaho 407,411 (1980). 
As stated recently by the New Mexico Supreme Court in Albuquerque Commons 
Partnership v. City of Council ofAlbuquerque, 144 P.3d at p. 421-422 (N.M., 2008): 
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See 3 Edward H. Ziegler, Jr; Rathkopfs Law of Zoning and Planning, 
$40:22 at 40-49 (2005) (noting that characterization as quasi-judicial can 
result in the parties being entitled to greater procedural rights and enabling 
reviewing courts to conduct a closer scrutiny of the merits of the decision). 
Quasi-judicial zoning matters are not politics-as-usual as far as the 
municipal governing body is concerned. In such proceedings, the council 
does not sit as a mini-legislature, as it functions in most matters, but 
instead must act like a judicial body bound by "ethical standards 
comparable to those that govern a court in performing the same function." 
High Ridge Hinkle Joint Venture v. City ofAlbuquerque, 888 P.2d 475, 
486 (N.M.App.1994). 
A, Members Of The BOCC Are Not Authorized To Make Independent 
Site Visits Nor To Advocate Denial Of The Application Based On 
Their Own Personal Studies 
1. Impermissible Reliance On Personal Studies 
It is an impermissible violation of due process rights for a member of the BOCC, 
in stated opposition to the project, to view the property and the highway running through 
the property, conducting "studies" on his own, without authority from the BOCC or 
notice to KHD, the BOCC and the public. Comer v. County of Twin Falls, 130 Idaho 
433,439 (1997) (the Board of County Commissioners, which was considering an 
application, violated due process rights when they reviewed property in question without 
notice and without giving parties or their representative opportunity to be present); See 
th . 
also Nasierowski Bros. Inv. Co. v. City ofSterling Heights, 949 F.2d 890 (6 Cir. 1991) 
and Harris v. County of Riverside, 904 F.2d 497, 501-02 (9" Cir. 1990) (both finding that 
the procedural due process rights of the owners were violated where they were not given 
notice in a quasi-judicial zoning proceeding). 
Here, the Idaho Transportation Department determined that the KHD project was 
well within the capacity of Highway 97 and had no objection to KHD moving to the next 
stage in the process. By statute (I.C. $40-3 10 et seq.), ITD is given sole authority over 
all decisions concerning congestion, adequacy, and safety on state highways. 
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Even though preempted by statute, the BOCC elevated itself over the expertise of 
ITD and relied on its own Board member, Elmer Currie's amateur "traffic studies" to 
reach the pretextual conclusion that KHD's application does not comply with Goal No. 
14. The BOCC's Order of Decision in its denial of KHD's first application makes clear 
that the BOCC abandoned ITD's determination in favor of its ow11 ad hoc analysis: 
The result of the constantly changing position of ITD was a significant 
degradation of their credibility with the County on this PUD. The position 
of ITD was not supported by the public testimony or the personal 
experiences of the BOCC. As a body the BOCC has almost one-hundred 
and fifty years of experience living in Kootenai County. The members 
have, over the years, traveled Highway 97 for personal as well as 
professional reasoil both for the County and in private employment. It has 
been their personal experience that Highway 97 in its present state is not 
conducive to this increased level of development. 
(Findings of Board of Commissioners of Kootenai County, Order of Decision, PUD 054- 
05, page 7, ROA.) Chairman Currie even related his own experiences in driving State 
Highway 97 even though he is neither qualified to make these judgments, nor is there any 
statute giving the BOCC the authority to take these findings into account. Doing so is a 
violation of Idaho statutory law, providing that the approval or denial of an application 
"shall be based upon standards and criteria which shall be set forth in the comprehensive 
plan, zoning ordinance or other appropriate ordinance or regulation of the city or county." 
I.C. § 67-6535. 
The "personal studies" of the capacity of Highway 97 by Commissioner Currie, 
without the presence of an ITD, BOCC or KHD representative were a gross breach of due 
process. It was further aggravated because the "personal studies" were used by him to 
personally advocate against and oppose the application and were in fact adopted by the 
BOCC. (See Findings of BOCC on PUD 054-05, p. 7, ROA, First Appeal, 1966). 
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Moreover, the question of adequacy of grades on a state highway are within the sole 
authority of the ITD, which in fact advised the BOCC that the grades were acceptable and 
that further details would be appropriate at later permitting. Thus, the BOCC reliance on 
the "personal studies" opposing the project was error and went beyond the authority of 
local government when acting in a quasi-judicial capacity. Interested parties in a quasi- 
judicial land use approval proceeding are entitled to an opportunity to present and rebut 
evidence to a tribunal which is impartial in the matter, i.e. having had no pre-hearing or 
ex parte contacts concerning the question at issue. Albuquerque Commons Partnership v. 
City Council of Albuquerque, 189 P.3d 41 1 at 423 (N.M. 2008). 
Since the BOCC placed heavy reliance on the inadequacy of the grades of 
Highway 97 based on ultra-vires and unethical studies by a board member, this must lead 
to a vacation of the BOCC's determination. 
2. Im~ermissible Commissioner Bias 
The BOCC is not allowed to advocate approval or denial of the application 
"When acting upon a quasi-judicial zoning matter the governing board is neither a 
proponent nor an opponent of the proposal at issue, but sits instead in the seat of a judge." 
Marcia T. Turner, LLC v. City ofTwin Falls, 144 Idaho 203, 159 P. 3d 840, 846, (2007). 
"In this context, the Due Process clause would therefore apply to the zoning board in the 
same way that it applies to judges." Id Due process in an administrative setting requires 
that the hearing is conducted before an impartial, unbiased review panel; even a 
probability of actual bias on the part of those with decision-making power is enough for 
the Claimant to establish that there has been a due process violation. Nasha LLC v. City 
ofLos Angeles, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 772, 780 (Cal. App. 2004) (an article in a newsletter 
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written by member of commission established a "probability of actual bias" giving rise to 
a procedural due process violation). 
Commissioner Currie was not an impartial arbiter here. Due process entitles an 
applicant to an impartial and disinterested tribunal, including administrative proceedings. 
Davisco Foods Int'l v. Gooding County, 141 Idaho 784,791 (2004). In Davisco, this 
Court found that there was no evidence of bias because one of the commissioners came to 
the hearing with an open mind. That is not the case here. Commissioner Cusrie 
impermissibly advocated denial of KHD's applications from the filing of the first 
application. See Place v. BoardofAdjustment, 200 A.2d 601 (N.J. 1964) (improper for 
the mayor to appear before the board on behalf of a litigant); Montgomery County Bd of 
Appeals v. Walker, 180 A.2d 865 (Md. 1962) (the board, like "Caesar's wife," should be 
above suspicion); Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Dallas County, 675 N.W.2d 544 
(Iowa 2004); L.A. Ray Realty v. Town Council of Town of Cumberland, 698 A.2d 202 
(R.I. 1997) (finding of official animus toward developer constituted a violation of 
procedural due process). 
B. It Is A Violation Of Substantive Due Process For A Ouasi-Judicial 
Body To Be Swayed By Public Sentiment And Political Pressure To 
Deny The Applications Based On Ultra Vires Public Requests To 
Change The Zoning Of The Site 
Substantive due process is violated by a governmental body acting arbitrarily and 
capriciously, umeasonably, for improper motives, and by improper means. This includes 
acting on the basis of a change in political climate. Wheeler v. City of Pleasant Grove, 
664 F.2d 99, 100 (5th Cir. 1981); Brady v. Town of Colchester, 863 F.2d 205,216 (2d Cis. 
1988) (cannot deny a permit based on "impermissible political animus"); L.A. Ray 
Realty v. Town Council of Town of Cumberland, 698 A.2d 202 (R.I. 1997) (developers 
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have a constitutionally protected property interest in subdivision approvals when they 
have complied with all valid regulations); Hollywood Beach Hotel Co. v. City of 
Hollywood, 329 So.2d 10, 16 (Fla. 1976) ("adverse political climate" is not a reason to 
change zoning classification of the plaintiffs' property); Cine SK8, Inc. v. Town of 
I-lenrietta, 507 F.3d. 778,786 (2nd Cir. 2007) (adverse political animus of even one 
member of a board is enough to constitute a substantive due process violation). 
The evidence here reveals that the BOCC was swayed by the large numbers of the 
public who attended the hearings and requested that the applications be denied on the 
basis that the use was not compatible with the area, regardless of the zoning on the 
property. The New York Court of Appeals has opined on a similar case where an 
applicant for a conditional use permit authorized for a shopping center by the zoning 
ordinance was denied the permit because the public wanted the property downzoned to 
residential. In finding the actions of the city arbitrary, capricious and discriminatory, the 
Court voided the city's actions and ordered the issuance of the permit. Udell v. Haas, 
235 N.E.2d 897,900 (N.Y. 1968): 
[i]n exercising their zoning powers the local authorities must [not] act 
because of the whims of either an articulate minority or even majority of 
the community . . . and . . . ensure that the public welfare is being served 
and that zoning does not become nothing more than a Gallup Poll. 
If this were a legislative decision by the BOCC, listening to any objections by members 
of the public may be appropriate. However, when the BOCC is acting in a quasi-judicial 
capacity, public opinion on matters outside of the project's conformity with the zoning 
ordinance is entirely irrelevant. See Albuquerque Commons Partnership at p. 422: 
Quasi-judicial zoning matters are not politics-as-usual as far as the 
municipal governing body is concerned. In such proceedings, the council 
does not sit as a mini-legislature, as it functions in most matters, but 
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instead must act like a judicial body bound by ethical standards 
comparable to those that govern a court.. . 
The BOCC abdicated its quasi-judicial role and succumbed to political pressure, resulting 
in an impermissible violation of KHD's substantive due process rights. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The District Court committed legal error by applying a legislative standard 
instead of an administrative standard when analyzing the decision of the BOCC. Further, 
the District Court failed to recognize that the BOCC was equitably estopped &om 
denying KHD's applications by virtue of the Post-Mediation Agreement. Substantial 
rights of KHD as a landowner have been prejudiced, and KHD's due process rights have 
been violated. KHD respectfully requests that the Supreme Court vacate the decision of 
the District Court and remand with instructions that the BOCC approve KHD's Second 
PUD and subdivision application, upon the terms and conditions set forth in the Hearing 
Examiner's Recommendation of Approval to the first application (ROA, First Appeal, 
1655); the terms of the Post-Mediation agreement limiting the issues; and the Planning 
Staffs Recommendation of Approval of August 23,2007 (ROA, Second Appeal, 2065- 
2301). KHD further requests that this Court award KHD attorney's fees pursuant to 
Idaho Code jj 12-1 17. 
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DATED this Pmay of April 2009. 
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